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We construct a model of trade with matching frictions. The model provides a simple characterization
for the joint proces of prices, sales and inventory. We compare the implications of the model to certain
properties of housing markets. The model can generate the large price changes and the positive correlation
between prices and sales that we see in the data. Unlike the data, prices are negatively autocorrelated
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We construct a model of trade with matching frictions and use it to analyze several puzzling
features of the housing markets. Our baseline model is closely related to Shimer’s (2007) model
of mismatch between workers and ﬁrms. Whereas Shimer’s focus was on the distribution of
unemployment and vacancies, our focus is on the dynamics of equilibrium prices. The economy
is made up of a large number of markets each with a collection of homes. Potential buyers
sample markets searching for homes to purchase. Owners experience relocation shocks and
become sellers.
Markets in this economy swing between periods of tight supply and excess supply. Sometimes
there are more buyers than sellers, and the market is tight. Sometimes there are more sellers
than buyers and there is excess supply. During periods of excess supply buyers extract surplus
from sellers. Their ability to do so is limited by sellers option to wait and sell in the future.
Sellers who make a sale must be at least as well oﬀ as sellers who do not. This links prices
across periods. During periods of tight supply, sellers extract surplus from buyers. Their ability
to do so is limited by buyers option to search elsewhere. This links prices across markets. In
this sense, sellers—being tied to a location—are responsible for intertemporal arbitrage, whereas
buyers—being free to search across markets—are responsible for intratemporal arbitrage.
The model generates a very simple relationship characterizing the evolution of prices over
time: whenever there is excess demand, sellers extract the maximal price; whenever there is
excess supply, sellers must be indiﬀerent between sales today and sales tomorrow. This sim-
ple characterization places strong restrictions on the dynamics of prices and allows for easy
calibration.
We investigate the ability of this model to match three sets of facts. The ﬁrst two are
standard in the literature. The ﬁrst is the positive autocorrelation in house price appreciation
as documented by Case and Shiller (1989). The puzzle is that these swings do not appear to
2be explained by fundamentals. Case and Shiller (1989) argue that serial correlation in rents
does not explain inertia in price changes. In order to control for diﬃculties in measuring rents,
Glaeser and Gyourko (2006) use wages to proxy for fundamentals. They also are unable to
generate signiﬁcant positive serial correlation in price changes. The second set of facts is that
prices are volatile and price changes are correlated with the volume of transactions (Stein [1985],
Ortalo-Magne and Rady [2006]). The third fact is the negative correlation between the inventory
of unsold homes and future price appreciation. Several authors have included lagged measures of
the inventory of unsold homes in aggregate pricing equations (eg. Peach [1983]) and found that
the eﬀect was negative. As this fact seems to be less appreciated in the literature, we devote a
little time to extending it. We consider a sample of US cities, and ask whether the proportion
of vacant homes for sale helps to forecast subsequent price changes in the cross-section. We ﬁnd
that higher vacancies predict lower rates of price appreciation rather than higher rates of price
appreciation. This ﬁnding is consistent with the ﬁnding of positive autocorrelation in prices.
Our baseline model has mixed success. On the positive side, it generates a positive correlation
between price changes and the volume of transactions. A large number of transactions leads to
low inventory and high current prices. Calibrated versions of the model can also deliver sizable
movements in prices as shifts in market tightness lead to shifts in surplus between buyers and
sellers.
On the negative side, our baseline model generates negative autocorrelation in price changes
and a negative correlation between the inventory of unsold homes and future price appreciation.
The reason for this failure is instructive and likely to pose problems for any model that jointly
models prices and inventories. When the inventory of unsold homes is zero prices are at their
maximum and can only fall. Positive shocks therefore tend to raise prices today and lead
to falling prices in the future. Conversely, when inventories of unsold homes are high, prices
will tend to be low. The expected rate of price appreciation, however, must be high in order to
compensate sellers who must wait to sell in the next period. A shock that raises inventory causes
3price to fall today and rise tomorrow, thereby leading to negative short-run serial correlation
in price changes. The model generates positive autocorrelation in price levels, but negative
autocorrelation in price changes.
One possible explanation for these facts is that prices respond sluggishly to market conditions.
To generate sluggish price adjustment, we incorporate an informational friction into our model.
In particular, we assume that prices are posted before demand is revealed, as in the sequential
service economies of Prescott (1975) and Bental and Eden (1993). Demand uncertainty leads to
price dispersion in each market. Some sellers will charge low prices and sell with high probability,
whereas other sellers will charge high prices and sell only if demand is suﬃciently high. Prices
do not incorporate all contemporaneous information, causing prices changes to lag inventory
dynamics. When demand is unexpectedly high, prices will rise, but this rise will be tempered by
the fact that some homes sold at low prices. During the next period when inventory is known
to be low, it is now possible for prices to rise further.
This version of the model performs much better. A calibrated version of our sequential
service economy does generate signiﬁcant positive autocorrelation in price changes and the
correlation between inventories and subsequent price changes, while not negative, is close to zero.
As i g n i ﬁcant gap, however, remains between theory and data. First, the eﬀects of sluggishness
are short-lived. While the correlation between price changes in consecutive quarters is positive,
the autocorrelation function quickly turns negative. Second, informational frictions make the
price process much more sluggish, which reduces the volatility of house prices.
While our focus is on the time series properties of prices, the models that we consider shed
light on other features of the trading process. The sequential service economy, captures the
ambiguity in the relationship between price and time-on-the-market. In any given market in
any given period, high prices are correlated with a longer time on the market, since high priced
homes are less likely to sell. Across markets and time, however, high prices are correlated with
low inventory and hence a greater probability of sale. The sequential service economy also makes
4the prediction that price dispersion is correlated with sales.
The model is complementary to search models of housing such as Wheaton (1990). These
models also predict, a positive relationship between price and market tightness. They generally
imply that tight markets face expected future price declines. There are several diﬀerences
between the two frameworks. In search models buyers and sellers match bilaterally. Brokers
and multiple listing services, however, give agents the ability to sample more widely. In our
framework, buyers and sellers see all of the houses that are for sale at any given period of time.
Search models tend to keep bargaining power ﬁxed so that all price ﬂuctuations are generated
by ﬂuctuations in the outside option. Bargaining power shifts between buyers and sellers with
market conditions in our framework. Search models cannot easily accommodate alternative
market structures such as in the sequential service economy. Interestingly, search models do not
seem to generate the ambiguity in the relationship between price and time on the market.1
Section 2 presents and analyzes the basic model. Section 3 discusses some of the comparative
static properties of the model. We calibrate the model in section 3. Section 4 presents some
evidence from US cities on the correlation between market tightness and subsequent price ap-
preciation Section 5 considers a version of the model with prices that are posted before demand
is realized. Section 6 concludes.
2. A model of a housing market
We present the basic model below. In subsequent sections we show how varying the timing of
events alters the properties of the equilibrium.
Our focus is on the implications of trading frictions for price behavior. We keep other aspects
of the model as simple as possible. Like in the Lucas’ (1978) asset pricing model, we consider
1In Wheaton’s model tight markets lead to high prices and quick sales. In Albrecht et al. sellers who remain
on the market become desparate and reduce prices; again price and time-to-sell are negatively related. See also
Krainer (2001) and Novy-Marx (2008).
5a economy in which equilibrium quantities are clear. What is not clear is how to price the
asset, housing. To focus on ﬂuctuations in price that are driven by shifts in bargaining power
between buyers and sellers, we remove all other sources of price ﬂuctuations. There are only
two sources of heterogeneity: sometimes some agents cease deriving utility from their homes,
and there is some randomness in the search process. Otherwise all houses and all agents are
identical. We also remove all life-cycle and ﬁnancial considerations. We assume that agents
always have enough assets or borrowing ability to purchase their house.
2.1. Environment
Time is discrete and indexed by t. The economy is composed of a continuum of housing markets
of measure one. Markets are indexed by i ∈ [0,1]. Each market holds a ﬁnite number homes;
we denote this number by H. There is a population of ¯ N agents per market. Agents are risk
neutral.
Each home has a single owner. There are two types of home owners: those who are well
matched with their current home and those who are mismatched. Well-matched owners derive γ
units of utility from their homes in each period. Owners who are mismatched derive zero utility.
Matches evolve over time. New owners are always well matched in the period in which they
purchase their homes. At the very beginning of each period some well-matched owners become
mismatched. Let z denote the probability that a well-matched owner becomes mismatched in a
period. For simplicity, mismatched owners remain mismatched forever.
We make several assumptions on the structure of matches so that well-matched owners choose
not search and so that agents who become mismatched choose to sell their homes and search for
a new match in some other market. First, we assume that an agent can derive utility from only
o n eh o m ea tat i m e ,a n dt h a ta na g e n tc a n n o ts e a r c hp r o a c t i v e l ya n ds t o c k p i l ew e l l - m a t c h e d
homes in anticipation of the agent’s current match dissolving.2 Well-matched owners therefore
2An assumption that would justify ruling out proactive search is that agents do not know where to search until
6have no incentive to search for housing. Second, we assume that mismatched owners are also
mismatched with other homes in their market, so that they gain nothing by swapping homes
amongst themselves.3 They therefore must search elsewhere. Third, we allow mismatched agents
to search for new homes while they sell their old homes. In fact, we do not link in any way an
agent’s decision to sell their old home and purchase a new one.4
Search is a black box. We model the outcome of the search process, rather than search itself.
Let N denote the average number of searchers per market. Note N<¯ N since only mismatched
owners search. The outcome of the search process is a probability distribution φ(n;N) which
gives the probability that n buyers arrive in a market conditional on their being a mass N of
searchers in the economy. Note that n is an integer, since the number of homes in a market H






This is the density that arises when a mass N agents each choose uniformly over a unit mass of
markets. Another convenient functional form is “exponential search”:
φ(n;N)=( 1− πN)π
n−1
N ,π N ∈ (0,1)
Here πN i ss e ts ot h a tt h ea v e r a g en u m b e ro fb u y e r si se q u a lt oN. This formulation will prove
their current match disolves. Suppose that locations were grouped into diﬀerent types and that when a match
dissolved the agent learned his new type. By increasing the number of types, we could make it prohibitively
expensive to the insurance that proactive search provides.
3Hanushek and Quigley (1979) argue that separations are mainly due to exogenous life events — loss of job,
change in family composition.
Many people, however, move within a metropolitan area. Here one might think of the market more narrowly
as both a location and a particular type of housing (eﬃciency, one-bedroom, two-bedroom, yard/no yard).
4Linking the purchase and sales decisions can lead to anomolous results. For example, if agents must sell their
current home before purchasing a new one, then house prices may be negative for reasonable parameterizations.
Agents are willing to pay buyers to take their homes so that they may enter the search process and purchase
another home at a negative price. Decoupling the sales decision links house prices moer closely to the value of
fundamentals, in this case the present value of γ.
7convenient when we consider uncertain demand. In this formulation the arrival of n buyers says
nothing about the arrival of the (n+1)st buyer. Note that search is not directed in any of these
formulations. The simplicity of the model is due to the fact that prices do not aﬀect search.
This allows us to solve for allocations independent from prices.
Prices are determined by Bertrand competition among sellers. The total number of buyers
and sellers in market i at date t is known when sellers set prices.5 After prices are set, buyers
queue up randomly and choose sequentially whether to purchase a home or to wait and search
again in the next period. If a buyer chooses to purchase a home, the buyer becomes the new
well-matched owner. Unsold homes remain in the pool of mismatched homes in the next period.
We assume that owners of unsold homes incur a carrying cost l units of utility (which may be
equal to zero) each period that their homes remain unsold. This carrying cost is in addition to
the delay in receiving payment for the home.
The timing of events within a period is as follows: owners become mismatched, buyers arrive,
sellers set prices, and trade takes place. Buyers and sellers make purchase and pricing decisions
in order to maximize the present value of utility. Prices are quoted in units of utility. Utility in
period t is the sum of utility from housing plus the price of any homes sold less the price of any
home purchased.6 Future utility is discounted by a factor β ∈ (0,1).
The model is set up so that we can solve for quantities ﬁrst and then prices. Note that
it will be eﬃcient for all potential trades to take place each period. Trade simply replaces a
mismatched owner with a well-matched owner. In the next section we use the assumption of
eﬃcient trade to solve for the evolution of sales and inventory in each market as a function of
separation rate z and the arrival rate φ. The following section then solves the Bertrand pricing
game among sellers given the evolution of sales and inventory and conﬁrms that eﬃcient trade
is in fact an equilibrium.
5An alternitive formulation would be to have sellers set prices before demand is realized. We will return to
this issue below.
6The linearity of utiltiy in prices means that we do not need to track the distribution of wealth.
82.2. Solution
2.2.1. Quantities
We drop the subscripts i and t except where they are necessary to avoid confusion.
It is useful to deﬁne two sets of sellers. Let b ∈ {0,H} denote the number of sellers at the
beginning of the period, after the match shock, but before trade. Let e ∈ {0,H} denote the
number of sellers at the end of the period after trade has taken place. bt −et−1 will be equal to
the number of newly mismatched owners in the market at date t. The number of homes sold in
the market will be equal to et − bt.
We solve for the steady state distribution of homes for sale at the beginning and end of
the period. The dynamics of each market are described buy the probability that a match will
dissolve z and the probability that buyers will arrive φ(n;N).
We create two transition matrices. The ﬁrst Pz describes transitions from et−1 to bt.R e c a l l
e is the number of sellers at the end of a period and b is the number of sellers at the beginning
of a period after the realization of the match parameters. Pz is an H +1× H +1matrix. The
(i,j)th element gives the probability of moving from e = i−1 to b = j−1. It is upper triangular
since there is always a weakly positive ﬂow of new sellers, bt ≥ et−1. Given that the realization
of the probability z is independent across homes, the transition probabilities have a binomial
distribution. Given e,t h e r ea r eH −e well-matched homes that may become mismatched. The
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⎠zH−2(1 − z1) zH−1
. . .
. . . ... . . .
. . .
00 ... 1 − zz
00 ... 01
⎤
⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥
⎦
The second matrix describes transitions from bt to et. Given the assumption of eﬃcient
trade, the short side of the market determines the number of trades. The number of unsold
homes at the end of the period is equal to b − n if n<bor 0 if n ≥ b. This gives rise to a
transition matrix Pn,N which depends on φ(n,N). Pn,N is an H+1×H+1.T h e(i,j)th element
gives the probability of moving from b = i − 1 to e = j − 1. Pn,N is a lower triangular matrix,
since the number of buyers is weakly positive. We have
Pn,N =
⎡




i>1 φ(i,N) φ(0,N) ... 00
. . .
. . . ... . . .
. . .
P
i>H−1 φ(i,N) φ(H − 2,N) ... φ(0,N)0
P
i>H φ(i,N) φ(H − 1,N) ... φ(1,N) φ(0,N)
⎤
⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥
⎦
The ﬁrst column represents the probability that n ≥ b.
From Pn,N and Pz, we can derive the transition matrices form et−1 to et and from bt−1 to
bt. Transitions from et−1 to et are governed by Pe = PzPn. Transitions form bt−1 to bt by
10Pb = Pn,NPz.N o t et h a ts i n c ePz has strictly positive elements above the diagonal and Pn has
strictly positive elements below the diagonal, Pb and Pe are everywhere strictly positive.
Let λ
e be a (H +1 )×1 vector that gives the the steady-state, cross-sectional density of end
of period sellers.The ith row gives the fraction of markets with e − 1 sellers (the ﬁrst row is










e is the eigenvector associated with the unit eigenvalue of P0
e. Since all of the elements of Pe are
strictly positive, there exists a unique λ
e (for any N). Similarly we may deﬁne λ
b as a density











To determine N, we calculate the implied population. Let Z be an H × 1 vector whose
elements are {0,1,2...H}.G i v e n N there is a density λ
b of unmatched homes. This implies
that the average number of matched homes per market is
H − λ
b · Z
The total population is divided into matched homeowners and searchers. Hence the implied
11population is
H − λ
b · Z + N
Note that λ
b · Z is decreasing in N, since increasing N leads to more sales and hence fewer
unmatched homes. There is therefore a unique N such that7
H − λ
b · Z + N = ¯ N
This completes the analysis of quantities. We now turn to prices.
2.2.2. Prices
Price setters play a Bertrand game. We look for an equilibrium in pure strategies. Since all
sellers are alike, each sets the same price. The state variable that matters for pricing is e,t h e
number of unsold homes at the end of the period. e determines the reservation value of buyers
and sellers. Sellers who wait to sell in the future only care about the number of unsold homes
that remain at the end of the period. Buyers care only about the price that they may receive
in the future which depends only on e.
We deﬁne a number of useful expressions. Let v denote the present value of being a buyer
searching this period. Let V be an (N +1 )× 1 vector that gives the value of owning a home
when there are e unsold homes at the end of the period. The ith row gives the value of owning
a home when there will be i−1 unsold homes. Let p a (N +1 )×1 vector of equilibrium prices.
Again the ith row gives the price of a home conditional on there being i−1 unsold homes at the
end of the period. Let W be an (N +1 )× 1 vector that gives the value of the optimal selling
strategy when there are e unsold homes at the end of the period. Note that the linearity of
7Suppose that we start out of steady state, how would the economy behave? Would it converge? Monotoni-
cally? At what rate? Convergence is made diﬃcult by the fact that Nt and hence Pn,Nt may change over time
if the economy begins out of steady state. This is a time inhomogenous Markov chain and standard convergence
theorems do not apply.
12utility and the lack of borrowing constraints make the problem of selling a home separable.
There are two cases to consider: e =0and e>0.8 If e =0 ,t h e nn>b .T h e r ea r e( w e a k l y )
more buyers than sellers. Every seller makes a sale. Sellers in this case behave collectively as
monopolists. They extract all of the surplus from buyers. Price is equal to the buyers maximum
willingness to pay.
V0 − p0 = βv (2.1)
where V0 is the value of owning a home when e =0 ,a n dp0 is the price in this case.
If e>0, there are more sellers than buyers. Some homes go unsold.
We =m a x{pe,−l + βx
0
ePeW}
where xe is a column vector of zeros with a one in the e +1row. With Bertrand competition
among identical sellers, sellers must be indiﬀerent between selling today and holding on to their
homes in order to sell in the future. Hence pe = −l + βPeW and We = pe. It follows that
pe = −l + βx
0
ePepe > 0 (2.2)
Note that we can iterate indiﬀerence forward. Sellers are indiﬀerent between selling today
and waiting in every period that e>0. It follows that sellers are indiﬀerent between selling
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(2.3)
This characterization immediately implies that p is monotonically decreasing in e;a se rises so
does T.
8This is similar to Shimer (2007). Shimer has two wages depending on whether or not there is excess supply
of workers. Here we have several prices. The diﬀerence is that Shimer only has spot markets whereas we have a
durable.
13Note that equilibrium considerations aﬀect prices only through p0 according to equation
(2.1), and, given p0, all other all other prices are determined by equation (2.2). Hence given p0,
pe depends only on Pe, β,a n dl.
2.2.3. The value of owning a home
We now consider the value of owning. Let P+
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⎠zH−3(1 − z) zH−2
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00 0 ... 01
00 0 ... 00
⎤
⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥
⎦
Let P−
z be a (H +1 )× (H +1 )matrix such that
Pz =
⎡
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⎠z(1 − z)H−2 ... zH−2 0
00 ( 1 − z)H−3 ... zH−3 0
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. . . ... ... . . .
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00 0 ... 10
00 0 ... 00
⎤
⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥ ⎥
⎦
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z gives e to b transition probabilities from the perspective of an owner who himself receives
a z shock. P−
z gives the transition probabilities from the perspective of an owner who remains
matched. These present the probabilities of other owners becoming mismatched. We have9










1 − β(1 − z)





z Pn,N (W + v)
The value of owning a home is equal to the ﬂow value γ plus the present value of an optional
policy in the future. In the future, with probability 1 − z, the owner will remain matched
and receive EV conditional on remaining matched. With probability z, the owner will become
mismatched and receive the value of an optimal sales policy, as well as the value of search v.
Note that W = p.
2.2.4. The value of search
We now turn to the value of search. A searcher is randomly allocated across markets. The value
of search depends on the probability that the searcher purchases a home and the price at which
t h a tp u r c h a s ei sm a d e .T h ep r o b a b i l i t yt h a tt h em a r k e th a sb sellers is λ
b. The probability that
the market has n buyers is φ(n;N). These two probabilities are independent. If n<bthen
the searcher makes a purchase and receives a beneﬁt Vb−n − pb−n.I f b>nthen the searcher
receives βv regardless of whether or not the seller makes a purchase: in these states sellers are

















9Note that VH is not well deﬁned in this expression, since a person cannot be well matched in a market in
















An immediate consequence of equation (2.3) is that price is negatively correlated with end
of period inventory. The expected time to stock-out T is monotonically increasing in e.P r i c e
ﬂuctuations result in shifts in surplus between buyers and sellers. In this model the fundamental
value of the house is a constant ﬂow γ. Given that z is likely to be quite low, buyers valuations
Ve will not change much as e changes. Sellers get a better deal in tight markets and buyers get
a better deal in loose markets.
The inventory dynamics lead naturally to mean reversion in the long run. Given that Pe
has no non-zero elements, it follows immediately that the expected inventory level converges to
the average of the elements of λ
e. Higher inventory levels are expected to fall. Lower inventory
levels are expected to rise. This leads to long-run negative correlation in price changes. If prices
rise today, inventories fall, leading to expectations of future increases in inventories and price
reductions.
An immediate consequence is that price changes are predictable. In fact there are two cases,
depending on whether or not there are end of period inventories. When end of period inventories







When l is equal to zero price appreciation is bounded above by 1/β, the risk free rate. As
in the Hotelling (1931) model of natural resource extraction, if prices were to rise faster, each
seller would have an incentive to wait. This would push prices up and reduce the rate of price
16appreciation. If prices were to rise at a slower rate, each seller would have an incentive to sell
today. Competition among sellers would bid prices down and increase the rate of appreciation.
When end of period inventories are zero, p0 = V0 − βv and the expected price is x0
0Pep.
Recall xe is a column vector of zeros with a one in the e +1row. Since pe <p 0 for all e>0,
prices are expected to fall. Unlike when e>0, all sellers are already making sales so there is no
additional supply of unmatched owners to push down prices. One might ask whether matched
owners have an incentive to enter the market and take advantage of the high prices. Matched
owners, however, are identical to the buyers. Since the buyers are willing to buy at price p0 in
spite of the prospect of falling prices, matched owners are also willing to remain in their homes.
While expected price changes are bounded above by 1/β when l =0 , actual price changes
are likely to be much greater. Consider a market with one unsold home. The upside is bounded
by p0. The downside is eﬀectively unbounded. The price must therefore be less than βp0 in
order to generate an expected increase of 1/β. The model therefore has the potential to generate
large price changes.
Since equilibrium considerations aﬀect prices only through p0 according to equation (2.1),
m a n yo ft h ep r o p e r t i e so fp r i c e si nt h i sm o d e la r er o b u s tt oc h a n g ei nt h es t r u c t u r eo ft h em o d e l .
Note that when l =0 , the characterization of the price process becomes particularly simple. In
this case, the ratio p/p0 follows from equation (2.2) independently of equilibrium considerations.
We will make use of this observation at several points below.
4. Calibration
To ﬁt the model, we ﬁrst need to determine the time period. The natural time period is the
one over which prices are ﬁxed. Unfortunately, there is not much evidence on the time between
p r i c ea d j u s t m e n t s .K n i g h t( 2 0 0 2 )r e p o r t st h a ta na v e r a g et i m eo f3 . 5m o n t h sb e f o r eal i s tp r i c e
change for a sample of homes in Stockton California during 1998. We therefore take the time
17period to be a quarter. Knight’s number, however, may overstate the period over which prices
are ﬁxed as some sellers may alter the price without altering the list price.
To simulate the model we need to calibrate N, z, β, H,γ,a n dl. We set β to 4% per year.
We set z to match data on turnover. Dieleman, Clark and Deurloo (2000) ﬁnd that the turnover
rate is about 8% per year for urban home owners. We therefore set z equal to .02 for quarterly
data. We choose N and H to match data on the time to buy and the time to sell. Anglin
a n dA r n o t t( 1 9 9 9 )r e p o r tt h a tt i m et ob u ya n dt i m et os e l la r eb o t hi nt h en e i g h b o r h o o do f
aq u a r t e r . 10 This results in H =7 2and N =2 .41. The small value of H is not troubling
since there is nothing in the model that says the market is large. We can think of markets in
the model as being quite speciﬁc: two bedroom homes located in a certain neighborhood. We
normalize γ to one and set l to zero.
Figure 1 presents price as a function of vacancies. As expected price declines monotonically
with vacancies. Figure 2 presents the steady-state density of vacancies across markets. Most
markets have no vacancies. Given that time to sell is equal to one period, there must be lots of
m a r k e t st h a ts t o c ko u te a c hp e r i o d .
On the positive side, the model can generate reasonably large price changes. The mean
absolute percentage change in prices in the calibrated model is 1.88% per quarter. The median
is zero, reﬂecting the large number of markets that stock out in consecutive periods. The
standard deviation is 3.10%. The model also generates a positive correlation between sales and
t h ec h a n g ei nh o u s ep r i c e s .T h ec o r r e l a t i o ni s. 2 9 .
The model misses badly on two other facts. The autocorrelation in price changes is -.18.
This is far from positive. The correlation between price changes and future vacancies is -.29.
Which is also far from positive. These correlations reﬂect the mean reversion in inventories
discussed above.
10Given that we have chosen the unit of time to be a quarter, we would need all homes to sell every period
to match a time to sell of one quarter. We assume that sales are spread evenly throughout the period, so that
immediate sales could as .5 quarters and sales after n periods count as n+.5 quarters.
185. Some Evidence on Market Tightness and Price Appreciation
A strong prediction of the baseline model is that inventories are negatively correlated with future
price appreciation. Price can only fall if end of period inventory falls to zero, and (if l =0 )t h e
expected rate of price appreciation is 1/β. Peach (1983) ﬁnds the opposite on aggregate data.
Given this divergence between model and data, we update his evidence.
We consider an unbalanced panel of cities. The data is annual. The time period is 1988 to
2005. We measure market tightness as the proportion of homes that are vacant and for sale.
The data is from the Bureau of Economic Analysis. The frequency is annual. This measure
obviously ignores homes that are occupied and for sale. Our maintained assumption is that
these are highly correlated. We take the S&P Case-Shiller index as our measure of house prices.
This is a repeat sales index. There has been much discussion of the potential biases in this
index. Unfortunately, there is no other widely available index that is obviously better. The data
begin in 1987 with 14 cities. Coverage increases to 20 cities over the same period.
We estimate the following relationship
∆pit = αi + βt + γ∆pit−1 + δvt−1 + εit (5.1)
Here ∆pit = pit − pit−1 is the price change in city i at date t. α is a city ﬁxed eﬀect meant to
capture diﬀerences in the natural vacancy rate. β is a time eﬀect meant to capture common
inﬂuences such as the state of the national business cycle or the level of interest rates. v
represents vacancies. These are lagged since we are interested in the predictive power of vacancies
for future price changes. ε is the error term.
Table 1 presents the results from estimating equation (5.1). We see the serial correlation
in price changes. We also see that vacancies have a signiﬁcantly negative correlation with
subsequent price changes.
19Table 1
Panel estimates of price appreciation





There results are robust to changes in speciﬁcation. Dropping the last year (2005) increases
the coeﬃcient on vt−1 to -1.96 with a standard error of .42, indicating that the eﬀect is stronger
before the recent run up in prices. Lagging vacancies by two periods also increases the coeﬃcient
on vacancies; it rises to -1.6 with a standard error of 0.6. Adding an additional lag price change
also does not aﬀect the results. Prices appear to decline following high vacancies, the opposite
of what the model predicts.11
6. Posting prices before demand is realized
One possible reason for the positive autocorrelation in prices and for the positive correlation
between inventories and future price changes is that prices respond sluggishly to market con-
ditions. To generate sluggish price adjustment, we incorporate an informational friction into
our model. We alter the above analysis by assuming that sellers post prices before demand is
realized. We continue to assume that sales are eﬃcient, so that the distributional dynamics do
not change. Prices, however, do not completely incorporate market conditions.
11In his discussion of this paper, Francois Ortalo-Magne presented evidence from a single neighborhood in
Madison Wisconsin that appeared to support the implications of the baseline model. In his data, a high inventory
of unsold homes appeared to be correlated with low prices and future price appreciation. This raises the possibility
that the relationship between prices and vacancies diﬀers at diﬀerent degrees of aggregation. The baseline model’s
predictions may be more applicable to very local markets.




N ,π N ∈ (0,1)
This simpliﬁes the analysis in several ways. First, there is always one buyer. Second, the
probability of additional buyers within the period is independent of how many buyers have
already shown up. This will imply that the optimal policy of the seller with the b highest price
is the same regardless of how many sellers have lower prices. This reduces the number of state
variables and leads to a simple recursive representation of price within a period.
Sellers set prices before demand is realized. Uncertain demand leads naturally to price
dispersion as in the analysis of Prescott (1975). Some sellers set low prices and sell with a high
probability. Others set high prices and sell only if demand is suﬃciently high. We assume that
sellers know how many other sellers there are as well as the prices set by these other sellers.
Equilibrium is characterized by indiﬀerence among sellers.12
Given the exponential distribution of buyers, we can think of buyers arriving sequentially.
We solve for the optimal pricing policy by induction. Suppose that there is one seller remaining
in the market and one buyer. This seller will set the monopoly price:
p0 = V0 − βv
Note we have indexed price p to the number of sellers left after the current sale is made and V
to the number of homes left on the market. This will facilitate comparison with the last section.
Now suppose that their are two sellers and one buyer. The low price seller will sell with
probability one. The other seller will set the monopoly price and sell only if another buyer
12This imposes a minimum amound of coordination among sellers. Things would be slightly diﬀerent if sellers
randomized independently. In this case, it would be possible for ineﬃciencies to arise. If, for example, all
sellers charged the monopoly price and there were only a few buyers, then the buyers might prefer search as
Ve − p0 <V 0 − p0 = v.
21a r r i v e s . T h el o wp r i c es e l l e rm u s tb ei n d i ﬀerent between selling immediately with probability
one or switching places with the “monopoly” seller.




pe = πpe−1 +( 1− π)[−l + βx
0
ePzp]
The following proposition shows the sense in which the lowest price when demand is uncertain
is related to the expected price when demand is known.
Proposition Consider two economies with identical values of π and V0 − v, but diﬀering in
when demand is realized. Let p denote the equilibrium price in the economy with uncertain
demand and ˆ p denote equilibrium price when demand is known before setting the price.
Then,
p = Pnˆ p
Proof: Let ˆ p0 =[ V0−v,0...,0]0,a n dl e tˆ pi = −l+βPeˆ pi−1. Standard dynamic programming
arguments imply that ˆ pi → ˆ p.
Now let p0 = Pnˆ p0 and suppose that for all j ≤ i − 1, pj = Pnˆ pj. We show that pi = Pnˆ pi.
The ﬁrst row of Pnˆ pi is is V0 −v.T h i si sa l s ot h eﬁrst row of pi. Suppose that the k −1st rows





























22The equality of Pnˆ pi and pi follows by induction. The convergence of Pnˆ pi, establishes the
proposition.¥
While the prices in the two markets are related, the stochastic properties of the price process
a r en o tt h es a m e . P r i c ed o e sn o tf u l l yr e ﬂect current demand when demand is uncertain.
Suppose that beginning of period inventory is high. Then some sales will be made at low prices
even if demand turns out to be high. The full eﬀects of high demand will only be incorporated
in a few higher priced sales. The average price during the period will be an average of both the
high and low prices. This averaging mutes the price increase during high demand periods. Since
demand was high, end of period inventories will be low, and next period prices will tend to be
high on average. In this way, the model can possibly generate positive serial correlation in price
changes and a positive correlation between end of period inventories and future price changes.
Calibrating the model to the parameters above, implies a value of πN of about .75. On
the positive side, the resulting correlation between price changes in adjacent periods is fairly
large, approximately .3. The correlation between inventories and future price changes, while not
positive, is at least very small, on the order of -.03. Incorporating demand uncertainty greatly
improves the models performance on these dimensions.
O nt h en e g a t i v es i d e ,t h es m o o t h i n go fp r i c er e d u c e st h ec o r r e l a t i o nb e t w e e nv o l u m ea n dt h e
change in price to about .1, and the average size of price changes is now about .5% per quarter.
Moreover, the persistence of price changes is fairly short-lived. The correlation between pt−pt−1
and pt−2−pt−3 is small and negative. It remains an open question if combining trading frictions
with serial correlation in the fundamentals can produce values that match the data.
There are also implications for the relationship between price and time-on-the-market. At
any given time, higher prices will be associated with lower probability of sale and hence greater
time on the market. Across periods however, prices will tend to be higher in tighter markets in
which time to sale is low.
There are also implications for price dispersion. Price dispersion is positively correlated with
23volume. When volume is high, sales work there way further up the pricing ladder. Initial sales
a r ea tl o wp r i c e s ,a n dﬁnal sales are at relatively high prices. We know of no evidence on this
implication of the model.
7. Conclusion
We have constructed a model of trading frictions and used it to price houses. The model leads
to a simple characterization of equilibrium prices. A robust feature of this model is the positive
correlation between vacancies and future price increases. This correlation is likely to be a feature
of any model with vacancies. Owners of unsold homes must be compensated for waiting.
The correlation between vacancies and future price appreciation makes it diﬃcult to generate
serial correlation in price changes. Positive shocks tend to reduce vacancies generating expecta-
tions of price declines. We have shown that the introduction of demand uncertainty and posted
prices, both realistic features of real estate markets, can overcome some of these diﬃculties in
the short run.
The model abstracts from several features that may hinder its ability to match these facts.
The only source of uncertainty is random shocks to supply and demand. Adding serial correla-
tion or even non-stationarity to the driving process could improve its ability to generate serial
correlation in price changes. The model abstracts from credit market frictions and life-cycle
saving. Ortalo-Magne and Rady (2006) argue that these feature may generate volatility and
covariance between price and volume. It remains an open question whether our mechanism in
combination with these or other mechanisms can explain can generate realistic housing cycles.
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Fig2: The density of vacancies